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Freedom as Satisfaction?
A Critique of Frankfurt’s Hierarchical Theory of Freedom1
Christian F. Rostbøll
Abstract
This article is a critical assessment of Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchical 
theory of freedom. It spells out and distinguishes several different and 
irreconcilable conceptions of freedom present in Frankfurt’s work. I 
argue that Frankfurt is ambiguous in his early formulation as to what 
conception of freedom of the will the hierarchical theory builds on, 
an avoidability or a satisfaction conception. This ambiguity causes 
problems in his later attempts to respond to the objections of wantonness 
of second-order desires and of infi nite regress. With his more recent idea 
of freedom as being satisfi ed with harmony in one’s entire volitional 
system, Frankfurt may solve the infi nite regress objection but he does 
so at the cost of ending up with a description of freedom, which comes 
very close to being identical to his own description of the wanton. 
Frankfurt’s account leaves open the question of whether the satisfactory 
harmony is caused by the inability to do otherwise, or is independent 
of it. To answer this question, Frankfurt’s hierarchical theory needs to 
be complemented with a number of “autonomy variables” (Double). 
Satisfaction may be a necessary condition of freedom, but it is not 
suffi cient. We also need to know how the person came to be satisfi ed. 
If being satisfi ed is merely something that happens to one, it fails to 
be an adequate description of a free person – and it also contradicts 
some of Frankfurt’s own earlier insights.
I
Frankfurt fi rst presents his hierarchical theory in his 1971 article, ‘Freedom 
of the Will and the Concept of a Person’. The main pillar of this theory is the 
distinction between fi rst-order desires and second-order desires. A fi rst-order 
Sats – Nordic Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 1 © Philosophia Press 2004
1 For comments and criticisms, I would like to thank Bernard Berofsky and an anonymous 
reviewer for this journal.
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desire is the simple “A wants to X”, where to X refers to an action. A second-
order desire, on the other hand, is the refl exive “A wants to want to X”, or in 
other words, the desire to hold a certain fi rst-order desire. Second-order desires 
may be of two kinds: First, a second-order desire may be a simple desire to hold 
a certain desire – without being moved to act by it. Second, it may be a desire 
that a certain desire be my will. Frankfurt calls the second kind of second-order 
desire for a “second-order volition.” And “it is having second-order volitions, 
and not having second-order desires generally, that [he] regard[s] as essential 
to being a person” (FWCP, p. 16),2 and to being able to enjoy or lack free 
will. For Frankfurt, then, “the statement that a person enjoys freedom of the 
will means … that he is free to want what he wants to want. More precisely, 
it means that he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he 
wants” (FWCP, p. 20). The question of freedom of the will does not concern 
the relation between what I want and what I do but rather the relation between 
my second-order volitions and my will. It is when my second-order volitions 
are not expressed in my will that my freedom of the will is frustrated.
The notion of a hierarchy of desires is meant to show that some desires are 
more truly the agent’s own than others. Or that the second-order volitions in 
some sense are the self. We will later have to go into more depth regarding what 
second-order volitions more precisely are. But fi rst let us look at the “wanton” 
who in contrast to a person cannot enjoy or lack free will. A wanton is an agent 
who does not have any second-order volitions. He does not care about his will; 
that is, he is indifferent as to which of his desires moves him to act.
To explicate the difference between a person who has second-order volitions 
and the wanton who does not, Frankfurt gives an example of two drug addicts.3 
One of the addicts hates his addiction. But we cannot say that he does not 
want or does not have the desire to take drugs; then he would not be an addict. 
However, the hierarchical theory makes it possible to say that he does not want 
to want to take the drug. This addict has confl icting fi rst-order desires, but he 
also has a volition of the second order. Within this framework, then, we can 
speak of an unwilling addict. “[T]he unwilling addict may meaningfully make 
2 Abbreviations of papers by Frankfurt:
APMR – ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’.
FWCP – ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’.
TCFA – ‘Three Concepts of Free Action’.
I&W – ‘Identifi cation and Wholeheartedness’.
FP – ‘The Faintest Passion’.
3 Frankfurt mentions a third kind of addict, the willing addict, which I discuss below. 
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the analytically puzzling statements that the force moving him to take the drug 
is a force other than his own, and that it is not of his own free will but rather 
against his will that this force moves him to take it” (FWCP, p. 18). The other 
addict is a wanton. He does not care about being moved by his addictive desire. 
Because he makes no second-order volitions, there is no hierarchy among 
his desires – having and being moved by one desire is just as good as being 
moved by another for him. The wanton addict cannot be said to be a willing 
addict since he has no will at all. Regarding the wanton, then, the question of 
freedom of the will does not arise.
II
Frankfurt mentions three different conceptions of freedom in ‘Freedom of the 
Will and the Concept of a Person’, without being very clear on the distinction 
between the second and the third. I fi nd it important to explicate the difference 
between these conceptions and will take them up in later discussions.
First, there is the idea of freedom of action:
 (1) Freedom of action “is fundamentally a matter of doing what one 
wants to do” (FWCP, p. 19).
This is clearly not what Frankfurt is concerned with in his hierarchical theory. 
“It misses entirely … the peculiar content of the quite different idea of an 
agent’s whose will is free” (FWCP, p. 20).
We saw above that freedom of the will means having the will one wants. This 
statement, however, is ambiguous. And Frankfurt seems to draw two different 
conceptions of freedom from it. Following terms suggested by Zimmerman 
(‘Hierarchical Motivation and Freedom of the Will’, p. 356f), we might call 
these two conceptions, the avoidability conception and the want-satisfaction 
conception of freedom of the will.
The avoidability conception of freedom of the will involves the ability 
to do otherwise. In this it can also be called a power concept of freedom. 
Frankfurt is known for not holding avoidability as a necessary condition for 
moral responsibility and has made an infl uential argument for this view in his 
1969 article, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. In that article, 
however, he is only concerned with moral responsibility and not with advancing 
a particular view of freedom. Now, consider this defi nition of freedom of the 
will from the 1971 article:
A person’s will is free only if he has the will he wants. This means that 
with regard to any of his fi rst-order desires, he is free either to make 
that desire his will or to make some other fi rst order desire his will 
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instead. Whatever his will, then, the will of the person whose will is 
free could have been otherwise; he could have done otherwise than 
constitute the will as he did (FWCP, p. 24).
On this conception freedom of the will not only requires harmony between 
second-order volitions and fi rst-order desires, but also that I could have chosen 
otherwise. Furthermore, this conception seems to imply that second-order 
volitions have causal effi cacy. My second-order volitions have causal effi cacy 
in this account in the sense of being able to determine which of my fi rst order-
desire becomes effective – in making it my will – but not in the sense of creating 
or generating (new) fi rst-order desires. For short,
 (2) Freedom of the will, the avoidability conception: my will is free 
when and only when I have the will I want if I could have constituted 
it otherwise than I did.
To explain the want-satisfaction conception of freedom, consider a third kind 
of addict – apart from the unwilling addict and the wanton addict – the willing 
addict. “The willing addict’s will is not free, for his desire to take the drug will 
be effective regardless of whether or not he wants this desire to constitute his 
will. But when he takes the drug, he takes it freely and of his own free will” 
(FWCP, p. 24f, emphases added). It is not entirely clear how to understand 
this. On the one hand, the willing addict’s will is not free; on the other hand, 
he does have the will he wants to have. But what does it mean for a person to 
do something “of his own free will” when his “will is not free”? In contrast 
to the wanton, the willing addict has a second-order volition endorsing his 
fi rst-order desire. And there is harmony between his second-order volition 
and his fi rst-order desire. But the case of the willing addict does not satisfy 
(2), since he could not have constituted his will otherwise. Let us formulate 
this conception as follows:
 (3) Freedom (of the will?), the want-satisfaction conception: a person 
is free when and only when he does what he does of his own free will, 
even if he could not have had another will.
Now, Frankfurt is not at all clear on whether (2) or (3) is the most important 
for his hierarchical theory. Is it that the effective fi rst-order desire is caused 
by – or more precisely, caused to be effective by – my second-order volition 
(2)? Or is it that my will is in accordance with my second-order volition? At 
one point Frankfurt seems to say that it could be either of the two: “it is in the 
discrepancy between his will and his second-order volitions, or in his awareness 
that their coincidence is not his own doing but only a happy chance, that the 
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person who does not have this freedom feels its lack” (FWCP, p. 20–1, emphasis 
added). But clearly it matters whether it is the one or the other.
One thing is clear, however; namely that Frankfurt thinks the weaker (3) 
is suffi cient for attributing moral responsibility. Frankfurt sees the willing 
addict as responsible for taking drugs. Because the willing addict wants the 
desire to take drugs to be effective, “he has made this will his own. Given that 
it is therefore not only because of his addiction that his desire for the drug is 
effective, he may be morally responsible for taking the drug” (FWCP, p. 25). 
Frankfurt makes a distinction between what is required for freedom of the will 
and for moral responsibility. But moral responsibility is only of minor concern 
for Frankfurt in ‘Freedom of the Will’; his main concern is freedom of the will. 
And Frankfurt only calls (2) freedom of the will.
I have dealt at some length with these distinctions because they seem to have 
been neglected in much of the literature,4 and especially in order to make it 
clear that Frankfurt in his later elaboration and refi nement of his theory seems 
to drop (2) in favor of (3). What I want to emphasize here is that it is (2) and not 
(3) Frankfurt sets forth as defi ning freedom of the will. And if Frankfurt drops 
(2), the question arises whether he is talking about freedom of the will at all.
III
We have so far neglected the question of what is so special about second-
order desires and volitions. There is a reason for this: Frankfurt is in his 1971 
article very vague about what makes second-order desires special. He is not 
clear on what makes them qualitatively different from fi rst-order desires and 
thereby why they are essential for freedom of the will. There are two closely 
connected problems related to this vagueness. First there is the objection 
raised by Gary Watson: “Can’t one be a wanton, so to speak, with respect to 
one’s second-order desires and volitions?” (‘Free Agency’, p. 108). In other 
words, couldn’t the second-order desires and volitions just be something one 
happens to have without it involving any freedom that one has them? Second, 
there is the problem of infi nite regress. That is, the problem of how we avoid 
4 However, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (‘Real-self Accounts of Freedom’, pp. 53–58) has made 
a similar attempt to distinguish the different conceptions of freedom present in Frankfurt’s 
theory. Lippert-Rasmussen conceptualizes my (2) – the avoidability conception – as “top down 
conformity involving alternatives” and my (3) – the want-satisfaction conception – as “mere 
top down conformity.” I have developed my distinctions independently of Lippert-Ramussen’s 
discussion but I do not see any contradictions between the two. Also, the way in which we use 
the distinctions in our overall arguments are different.
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ascending to higher and higher orders to fi nd the real self without cutting the 
sequence off arbitrarily.
IV
Frankfurt has tried to deal with these objections in ‘Identifi cation and Whole-
heartedness’ and ‘The Faintest Passion’. In this section I reconstruct the 
argument of the fi rst of these articles; in section V, I reconstruct the arguments 
of the second. I shall then, in section VI, discuss whether Frankfurt meets the 
objections.
Frankfurt concedes that the fact that a desire is of a higher order is not 
suffi cient to establish its authority. He therefore takes it upon himself to show 
when a higher-order volition “itself is one by which the person really wanted 
to be determined” (I&W, p. 166). Frankfurt also notes now that our freedom 
is not only frustrated when there is a confl ict between higher-order volitions 
and effective fi rst-order desires or between volitions and will. For there is 
another sort of inner division. This second division manifests itself as “a lack of 
coherence within the realm of the person’s higher-order volitions themselves” 
(I&W, p. 165). Whereas the fi rst sort of division is external to the volitional 
complex, the second sort of division is internal to it. In the second case, it is the 
agent himself who is divided. The problem we face now is how we can say that 
a higher-order volition is truly the agent’s own, that the agent is not a wanton 
with regard to these volitions. So for a person to be free not only requires that 
he acts in accordance with a higher-order volition, but also that the higher-order 
volition itself is one by which the person wants to be determined. The person 
must not only have the will he wants but also the volitions he wants.
In ‘Identifi cation and Wholeheartedness’, Frankfurt puts great emphasis on 
the idea of making a decision. The point of decision is the point of cutting 
off the ascent to higher orders (I&W, p. 170). I think this idea of making a 
decision gives a very “activist” way of looking at freedom, and below I shall 
argue that it contrasts with the more passive idea of being satisfi ed as that 
which constitutes freedom.
Frankfurt wants to show that “making a decisive commitment does not consist 
merely in an arbitrary refusal to permit an interminable ascent to higher orders” 
(I&W, p. 167). He invokes notions like endorse, support and wholeheartedly 
want to designate this decisive commitment (I&W, p. 163). In order to illustrate 
how an agent may come to endorse or identify himself with a volition, and 
thereby make a decisive commitment, Frankfurt takes as an example a situation 
of a person who tries to solve a problem in arithmetic. The person performs a 
calculation, after which he may perform any number of calculations to check 
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the answer. If the person at some point decides for some reason to adopt a 
result without reservation, “he has made a genuinely unreserved commitment 
to the view that adopting the answer is his most reasonable alternative, he 
can anticipate that this view will be endlessly confi rmed by accurate reviews 
of it” (I&W, p. 168). “The fact that a commitment resounds endlessly”, 
Frankfurt continues, “is simply the fact that the commitment is decisive. For 
a commitment is decisive if and only if it is made without reservation, and 
making a commitment without reservation means that the person who makes 
it does so in the belief that no further accurate inquiry would require him to 
make up his mind” (I&W, p. 168–9). To identify with a second-order volition, 
then, is to commit oneself to it endlessly and without reservation.
Frankfurt argues that there is nothing arbitrary in terminating a sequence of 
evaluation at the point “at which there is no confl ict and doubt” (I&W, p. 169). 
This point is the point of decision, the point of cutting off (the etymological 
meaning of “to decide” is “to cut off”, I&W, p. 170). I said above that the 
solution to the problem of incoherence within a person’s volitional complex 
requires that we can distinguish between desires that are integral to the person 
and those that are not. This question concerns when we can say that a desire 
really is the agent’s own, or in other words when we can say that it is the agent 
who freely acts. It is at this point we can see Frankfurt’s “activist” conception 
of freedom:
The decision determines what the person really wants by making a 
desire on which he decides fully his own. To this extent the person, in 
making a decision with which he identifi es, constitutes himself. The 
pertinent desire is no longer in any way external to him. It is not a desire 
he ‘has’ merely as a subject in whose history it happens to occur, as a 
person may ‘have’ an involuntary spasm that happens to occur in the 
history of his body. It comes to be a desire that is incorporated into him 
by virtue of the fact that he has it by his own will (I&W, p. 170).
Here the person constitutes himself by making a decision about his fi rst-order 
desires. He is free because he has endorsed a fi rst-order desire by an act of will 
as truly his. Let us try to formulate this as a defi nition of freedom.
 (4) Freedom as constitutive decision: A person is free when and only 
when he constitutes himself by the act of making a decision to make a 
desire fully his own.
This formulation should not be misunderstood so as the person can constitute 
himself any and all ways he likes. Frankfurt does not think we can form our 
character as we wish. A person is not free to causally create his own character; 
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he can only take responsibility for his characteristics by making a decisive 
identifi cation with them (I&W, p. 171).
The weakness of the account focusing on constitutive decision is that it 
ignores the possibility of unwitting decisions with which the person does not 
identify.5 Or we might say that it is possible to make decisions with which 
one is not satisfi ed. Seeing this objection, Frankfurt later abandons the notion 
of identifi cation as a kind of decision in favor of an account based on the idea 
of being satisfi ed.
V
In ‘The Faintest Passion’, Frankfurt elaborates on the issue of volitional unity 
and division. Here too his concern is to avoid the problem of an arbitrary cut-
off and of infi nite regress but he now takes a different approach than the one 
focusing on the importance of making a decision. To this end he invokes the 
notions of wholeheartedness and ambivalence. I think we can see these two 
notions as analogous to the person and the wanton in ‘Freedom of the Will’ 
but at the level of higher-order, refl ective attitudes. A person is wholehearted 
when there are no confl icts among his higher-order volitions, when he is not 
ambivalent. Ambivalence means that the will is divided. ‘This volitional 
division keeps [the ambivalent agent] from settling upon or from tolerating 
any coherent affective or motivational identity’ (FP, p. 99). About an ambivalent 
person there can be no truth, for there is no psychic position with which he 
identifi es.
Apart from being the opposite of ambivalence, Frankfurt invokes the idea 
of being satisfi ed to explain what wholeheartedness means. The idea of 
wholeheartedness is also meant to give a fuller understanding of the notion of 
identifi cation. A person is wholehearted with respect to his psychic elements 
when he is “fully satisfi ed that they, rather than others that inherently (i.e. non-
contingently) confl ict with them, should be among the causes and considerations 
that determine his cognitive, affective, attitudinal, and behavioral process” (FP, 
p. 103). It is important to understand exactly what being satisfi ed means here in 
order to see how Frankfurt thinks it could solve the problem concerning infi nite 
regress. The state of being satisfi ed must be a state from which the person will 
not ascent to higher orders. Frankfurt, therefore, holds that “[b]eing genuinely 
satisfi ed is not a matter … of choosing to leave things as they are or of making 
5 For this point see Michael E. Bratman (‘Identifi cation, Decision, and Treating as a Reason’, 
p. 193f).
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some judgment or decision concerning the desirability of change. It is a matter 
of simply having no interest in making changes” (FP, pp. 104–5).
Frankfurt connects this argument to the hierarchical account in the following 
way. The hierarchical account builds on the idea that freedom is related to 
the identifi cation with a higher-order desire endorsing a fi rst-order desire. 
But the preceding argument shows, “[t]he endorsing higher-order desire must 
be, in addition, a desire with which the person is satisfi ed” (FP, p. 105). The 
conception of freedom that follows from this is something like this:
 (5) Freedom as self-satisfaction: I am free when and only when I am 
satisfi ed with my endorsing higher-order desires.
VI
Does Frankfurt meet Watson’s charge that one can be a wanton with respect 
to one’s second-order volitions with his idea of being satisfi ed? I think not. I 
shall argue why. In doing so I shall both go into a more detailed analysis of 
Frankfurt’s argument in ‘The Faintest Passion’ and relate this argument to his 
earlier arguments, which I reconstructed above.
It is instructive to compare what it is to be a wanton to what it is to be a 
satisfi ed person; the one being the paradigm of non-freedom for Frankfurt, the 
other of freedom.6 A wanton is an agent who has no second-order volitions, 
“he does not care about his will” (FWCP, p. 16). The wanton is characterized 
by passivity with regard to his desires. Only the person is active since it is 
impossible to be a passive bystander to one’s second-order volitions (TCFA, 
p. 54). The satisfi ed person is satisfi ed with her psychic elements, which must 
mean that she is satisfi ed with the desires she has whatever order they may be. 
It is important for Frankfurt to construct the satisfi ed person so he need not 
form any higher-order desires in order to determine whether he is satisfi ed; for 
only in this way can he avoid infi nite regress. “There is nothing that he needs 
to think, or to adopt, or to accept, it is not necessary for him to do anything 
at all” (FP, p. 104). “Perhaps his condition could be improved at no net cost, 
and perhaps he is aware of this, but he simply does not care” (Ibid.). This 
description of the satisfi ed person seems to come very close to the passivity 
characteristic of the wanton.
6 Recall that the wanton is not even a person and, hence, cannot be unfree. To make this clear 
I write “non-freedom”.
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Frankfurt explicitly rejects this – of course. What self-satisfaction requires, 
according to Frankfurt,
is that psychic elements of certain kinds do not occur. But while the 
absence of such elements does not require either deliberate action or 
deliberate restraint, their absence must nonetheless be refl ective. In 
other words, the fact that the person is not moved to change things 
must derive from his understanding of and evaluation of how things 
are with him. Thus, the essential non-occurrence is neither deliberately 
contrived nor wantonly unselfconscious (FP, p. 105).
But what does “refl ective” mean here? And how can one be refl ective without 
recourse to higher orders?  In ‘Freedom of the Will’, Frankfurt saw “refl ective 
self-evaluation” as “manifested in the formation of second-order desires” 
(FWCP, p. 12). And in ‘Identifi cation and Wholeheartedness’, he says, “it is not 
clear to me that adequate provision can be made for refl exivity without resorting 
to the notion of hierarchical ordering” (I&W, p. 165, n7). Now with regard to 
being satisfi ed he also speaks of refl ection and evaluation of the self, but now 
it is meant to show that there is no need for recourse to higher orders. But it is 
not clear how adequate provision can be made for refl exivity without recourse 
to higher orders. Furthermore, how can a person evaluate “how things are with 
him” without “making some judgment or decision concerning the desirability 
of change” (FP, p. 104f)? Doesn’t any evaluation involve a comparison?
Frankfurt seems to be making two points with each their purpose. These two 
points can be seen as two different explications of self-satisfaction in (5).
 (5a) Satisfaction with one’s self does not require the agent to do anything 
at all.
This is meant to show that there is no danger of regress.
 (5b) Satisfaction with one’s self requires the refl ective absence of certain 
psychic elements.
This is meant to show that the satisfi ed person is not a wanton.
The problems I have pointed out above seem to stem from the irreconcilability 
of these two points.
So let us analyze closer what it is to be self-satisfi ed. “Satisfaction with one’s 
self requires,” Frankfurt writes, “no adoption of any cognitive, attitudinal, 
affective, or intentional stance … Satisfaction is a state of the entire psychic 
system” (FP, p. 104). That I am satisfi ed with my psychic state, then, cannot 
mean that I have formed an evaluation of this state representing my true self, 
nor can it mean that I desire this state. I have formed no intention about this 
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state, nor do I have any attitude towards it. I just happen to fi nd myself satisfi ed. 
How can this passivity be constitutive of free will? It clearly is at odds with the 
activist understanding of freedom expressed in (4). On that understanding the 
person constitutes himself by making a decision about his fi rst-order desires. 
He is free because he by an act of will has endorsed a fi rst-order desire as truly 
his. But on the satisfaction account there can be no such self-constituting acts 
with regard to higher-order desires, for towards these there are no taking a 
stance. Satisfaction on Frankfurt’s account is just something that happens to 
occur. So what does satisfaction have to do with free will? Frankfurt might 
object by reminding us of the requirement that absence of certain psychic 
elements must be refl ective and self-evaluative. But I simply cannot see how 
this requirement is possible without taking a stance.
Now we must consider how the idea of being satisfi ed relates to the basic 
framework of the hierarchical theory, which I summarized in section I, and 
specifi cally to the different conceptions of freedom distinguished in section II 
above. I think this move is justifi ed because Frankfurt does not present the idea 
of being satisfi ed as an alternative to the hierarchical account. Being satisfi ed, as 
we saw, is something the free person must be in addition to forming endorsing 
higher-order desires. Furthermore, there is a need to understand how the later 
account relates to the ambiguity in the earlier understanding.
It seems clear that the idea of being satisfi ed cannot be reconciled with what 
I called the avoidability conception of freedom of the will, (2) above. (2) is 
a power concept of freedom. On this view the ability to have the will I want 
requires that I have the power to make my fi rst-order desires conform to my 
second-order volitions. This power is something I either have or do not have, 
if I do I am free, if I don’t I am not. But now Frankfurt tells us that the higher-
order desire in addition must be a desire with which the person is satisfi ed. If I 
am satisfi ed I am free, if I am not satisfi ed I am not free. But I have no power 
over whether I am satisfi ed or not. The problem is that this powerlessness goes 
all the way down, as it were. For the whole purpose of the idea of satisfaction 
was to show that my higher-order endorsements were really free, that they 
represented what I really wanted. Since it is only when I am satisfi ed with my 
endorsing higher-order desires that I am truly free, it is of little consequence 
that I have the power to have the will I want. So if satisfaction is outside my 
power, the consequence of Frankfurt’s argument is that I have no free will. For 
recall that (2) was the only conception of freedom, Frankfurt calls freedom 
of the will.
The other candidate for a conception of freedom on the earlier account is the 
want-satisfaction conception, (3) above. According to (3), a person can be said 
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to do something freely even if he could not have done otherwise. This view 
seems more readily reconcilable with (5). The powerlessness of satisfaction sits 
more easily with the powerlessness of the willing addict. But is this a plausible 
understanding of freedom? I have some diffi culty in seeing the willing addict as 
free. It seems to me that an account of freedom ought to be capable of showing 
that something like addiction is an obstacle to freedom. Frankfurt could show 
this with (2), but he has given up on this conception.
In a review of the hierarchical theory, Gary Watson points to one of its 
possible merits that it can show that “addictive behaviour is hardly an instance 
of autonomy” (‘Free Action and Free Will’, p. 147). According to Watson 
there is “a general connection” in Frankfurt’s account of freedom between (i) 
dependency between fi rst-order desires and second-order volitions, and (ii) 
alternative possibilities defi ned relative to higher-order volitions. But he notes 
that in cases of overdetermination, like in the case of the willing addict, “the 
connection will not hold” (‘Free Action and Free Will’, p. 148). I can see the 
appeal of the hierarchical theory with regard to the unwilling addict; in that 
case the hierarchical account can show how a person’s freedom is frustrated by 
dissonance between second-order volition and effective fi rst-order desire. But 
with regard to the willing addict it is hard to see how the hierarchical account 
could explain addictive behavior as unfree when (2) is abandoned.
VII
The uneasiness of accepting the willing addict as free can be explained in terms 
of a criticism of Frankfurt made by Richard Double. Double’s criticism is aimed 
at the decisive commitment account, but I think it applies to the satisfaction 
account as well. Double’s
objection to Frankfurt’s way of addressing the identifi cation problem is 
that it at best provides only a subjective criterion for determining when 
choices ‘belong’ to agents … Frankfurtian decisive identifi cation may 
be suffi cient to establish that choices are psychologically free, that is, 
that agents feel free in making them. But decisive identifi cation seems to 
go no distance toward establishing that agents are really or normatively 
free, since one can easily imagine such decisiveness exemplifi ed by 
grossly irrational, unfree agents. (Double, ‘A Compatibilist Account 
of Free will’, p. 34)
For this reason Double thinks hierarchical accounts require “a strong rational-
ity component” (Ibid. p. 35). Double develops a theory to deal with local and 
global controllers but I shall stick to the case of addiction. Double identifi es 
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fi ve autonomy variables failure among which “raises the possibility that 
one’s choices are not under one’s reasoned control” (Ibid., p. 49). These are 
self-knowledge, reasonability, intelligence, effi cacy, and unity of agent (see 
summary, ibid., pp. 38, 48). I shall attempt to show what these might mean for 
the case of the willing addict. Self-knowledge requires that we know our mental 
states, that we have true beliefs about them. The interesting case here concerns 
self-deception (Ibid., p. 40). Suppose an addict believes that the only reason why 
he takes drugs is that he really wants to do so. This seems to be a very probable 
case. He believes that he has endorsed his fi rst-order desire to take drugs 
freely. But in fact he has adapted his second-order volition to his irresistible 
fi rst-order desire.7 “Reasonability is the motivation to critically evaluate one’s 
beliefs, desires, and choices” (Ibid., p. 38). Critically, reasonability implies 
that I evaluate my beliefs impartially. Thus, the addict to be reasonable must 
evaluate his addiction irrespectively of his inclination towards taking drugs. 
If his higher-order endorsement of his desire to take drugs is itself a result of 
his addiction he is unreasonable. “Intelligence is skill at gaining, retaining, and 
using knowledge, both about oneself and the world” (Ibid., p. 38). Regarding 
the addict suppose that he (1) has a fi rst-order desire to take drugs; (2) knows 
that taking drugs causes early death; (3) does not want to die prematurely; (4) 
holds (3) stronger than (1); and (5) concludes that he endorses his addiction.8 
If one lacks the intelligence to see the contradiction in this line of reasoning, 
it is diffi cult to see what makes his endorsement a free one. “Effi cacy is the 
power to control our mental states (including our choices)” (Ibid., p. 38). It 
“is the power to actually make self-knowledgeable, reasonable, and intelligent 
choices” (Ibid., p. 44). Finally “unity implies that there is a single agent 
underlying free choices” (Ibid., p. 38).  It is “the requirement that the other 
four variables apply to the same agent” (Ibid., p. 46). I do not think this last 
point adds anything to Frankfurt.
Does this account give us a possibility of giving a better account of the willing 
addict than Frankfurt’s account did? I think it does. First of all I should note that 
7 Jon Elster has written about this kind of adaptive preference formation in Sour Grapes. 
According to Elster the phenomenon of sour grapes is when an agent tries to reduce cognitive 
dissonance by non-consciously adapting his preferences to the possibilities (Sour Grapes, pp. 
25, 110). Elster, however, distinguishes addiction from sour grapes. “Addiction … is much more 
specifi c than sour grapes: it is to be explained more by the nature of the object of addiction than 
by the tendency of the human mind to adapt whatever objects are available”, (Ibid., p. 121).
8 Double (‘A Compatibilist Account of Free Will’, p. 44) uses a similar example, though he 
forgets step (4).
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the autonomy variables do not tell us whether an addict is free without a further 
analysis of what addiction is. If addiction in itself prevents the satisfaction 
of the autonomy variables, addiction clearly makes addicts unfree. Double’s 
account helps us to give a better account of the willing addict, I think, because 
it supplies some questions we would like to ask about the addict. Does the 
willing addict deceive himself about his desires? Is his higher-order volition 
merely an adaptation to an irresistible fi rst-order desire? Does he know what 
he is doing? Has he made an intelligent decision to take drugs? It is only when 
we know the answers to these question that we can make a judgment as to 
whether the willing addict is free or not. The uneasiness we might have about 
Frankfurt’s bare statement that the willing addict takes drugs freely since he 
wants to want to take drugs (and is satisfi ed with this state) is a result of these 
questions remaining unanswered.
Double’s autonomy variables may seem to be mainly epistemic in nature 
while I criticized the idea of being satisfi ed as being a passive state. But the 
epistemic goes together with the active in Double’s account. In the case of 
self-deception, the agent adapts his second-order volitions unconsciously and 
hence passively to his fi rst-order desire. There is no active involvement on the 
part of the agent. Lack of reasonability is also a state of passivity because it 
involves not critically evaluating one’s desires. And so forth. It is only if we 
have a unifi ed agent that reasonably, intelligently and with self-knowledge 
has the power to control her mental states that we can speak of free will. The 
problem with Frankfurt’s satisfaction account is that it excludes a consideration 
of these active elements in identifying one’s will.
VII
I have in the last few sections argued that it is diffi cult to see the willing addict as 
free just because there is no confl ict between his second-order volition and fi rst-
order desire. I have insinuated that Frankfurt could have solved the problem if 
he had held on to (2). But I think it is also possible to make a different argument 
that does not rely on the possibility of having formed one’s will differently.9 
We can formulate the point using Frankfurt’s own point in his critique of the 
principle of alternative possibilities. In that connection Frankfurt makes a 
distinction between doing something only because one could not have done 
otherwise, and doing something one is unable to avoid doing (APMR; TCFA, 
9 As far as I can tell Double’s additions do not require avoidability, but I cannot go into that 
here.
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p. 51f). In the latter case a person does “something in circumstances that leave 
him no alternative to doing it, without these circumstances actually moving 
him or leading him to do it” (APMR, p. 2). My point is that the hierarchical 
account is not suffi cient to making this distinction, it cannot tell when a person 
does something because of the circumstances and when he does something 
unavoidable independently of the fact of its unavoidability. Frankfurt, of course, 
thinks that when there is confl ict between second-order volition and effective 
desire, then one does what one does because of circumstances, the person is 
moved to do it despite of himself. But that is not suffi cient for assessing the case 
where there is harmony between fi rst-order desire and second-order volition, for 
there is no way to tell whether this harmony is a result of not being able to do 
otherwise or is formed freely. The application of Double’s autonomy variables 
in the preceding section showed this. It is only by investigating whether these 
conditions are met that we can know whether the person is passively responding 
to the unavoidable or actively endorsing it.
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